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TRADEMARK PIRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY ON
REEBOK INTERNATIONAL LTD.
I. INTRODUCTION
A pervasive problem in Latin American and other developing
countries is the unauthorized registration of internationally known
trademarks by "pirates" prior to registration by actual owners.1
After registering the trademark, a pirate has several options: (1)
sell the trademark back to the rightful owner;2 (2) distribute goods
bearing the trademark to consumers who believe they are genu-
ine;3 (3) exclude the rightful owner from the market by threaten-
ing an infringement suit;4 or (4) use the trademark to market
products that differ from those sold by the actual owner.5  In
countries lacking adequate intellectual property protection, some
companies and individuals specialize in registering well-known
trademarks.6 Many of these entities earn their livings by register-
ing trademarks and selling them back to companies that want to
reclaim their trademarks.7 One Brazilian attorney estimates that
companies pay from $10,000 to $1,000,000 to regain the rights to
their trademarks.8 Pirates who cannot or do not want to sell the
trademarks to the rightful owners manufacture and sell "legal"
1. John T. Masterson, Jr., Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in International
Transactions, in 1 THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTELLECTUAL TRADE &
INVESTMENT 1994, at 333, 349 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
863, 1994).
2. Reebok Calls Upon Latin American Leaders to Curb Trademark Piracy in
Developing Countries; Reebok Executive Discusses GATT, Future Extension of NAFTA,
Business Wire, Dec. 8, 1994, available in WESTLAW, LATNEWS Database [hereinafter
Reebok]; Kenneth Parks et al., Mercosur Nations Examine Trademark Piracy, 4 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 37 (1995).
3. Reebok, supra note 2; Neil A. Smith, Obtaining Trademark and Copyright
Enforcement in the United States for Infringement Abroad, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT 553, 555 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. 393, 1994).
4. Smith, supra note 3, at 555.
5. Reebok, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Lise Alves, Trademark Piracy Hinders Brazil Ahead of Free Trade Deal, Reuter
European Business Report, Dec. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File. 8. Id.
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counterfeit products.9 The products are legal because the pirate
is the registered owner in that country.
This Note examines trademark piracy in Latin America,
focusing on the problems experienced by Reebok International,
Ltd. (Reebok). Part II discusses the background of trademark
piracy, the reasons behind Latin America's reluctance to adopt
strong intellectual property laws, and the history of Reebok's legal
struggles to reclaim its trademark in Peru. Part III addresses the
attempts of the international community, Latin America, and the
United States to protect trademarks and discusses the success and
failure of those remedies. Part IV focuses on the best remedies
available to U.S. companies in Latin America, including: the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Ifitellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS Agree-
ment)," which is part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 (GATT 1994);", the Paris Convention for the Protec-
tion of Industrial Property (Paris Convention); 2 and an interna-
tional registration system. This Note argues that an international
registration system as part of the TRIPS Agreement provides the
best solution to trademark piracy because it eliminates the need for
multi-country registration. Companies would protect their
trademarks worldwide by registering them with the international
organization. In addition, member countries would have to
implement substantive laws in accordance with the TRIPS
Agreement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Problem of Trademark Piracy
Generally, trademark piracy occurs more often in civil law
9. Reebok, supra note 2.
10. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade
in Counterfeit Goods, GATT Doc. MTN/FA I-A1C (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement], reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TExTS 365-403 (World Trade Org. ed., 1995)
[hereinafter THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND]; 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197-1225 (1994).
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GAI1T Doc. No. MTN/FA (Dec. 15,
1993) [hereinafter GATT 1994], reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND,
supra note 10, at 21-38; 33 I.LM. 1125, 1154-66 (1994).
12. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, done July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1629 (1970), 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (1977) [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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countries than in common law countries like the United States.
13
This is because in civil law countries, the first party to register the
trademark acquires the right to use it.14 Registration allows the
registrant to enforce trademark rights against others.1 5 In com-
mon law countries, on the other hand, the first use of the trade-
mark establishes ownership, although the countries still require
registration. Therefore, the first party to use the trademark usually
prevails over the first party to register it, unless use of the
trademark established registration.16  In civil law countries,
trademark use without registration affords no protection to the
user. Some civil law countries, however, do provide protection if
the trademark is notorious, meaning it is well-known or famous."
In order to avoid trademark piracy, especially in civil law countries,
a company must register its trademark in each country where it
plans to market its products.18 Multi-country registration is
required because "trademark registration stops at the border and
does not give rights outside of [that country]."' 9 A company must
first decide in which countries to market its goods and then register
its trademark in those countries before any pirates do so. In 1986,
the International Trade Commission estimated that U.S. companies
lost between forty-three and sixty-one billion dollars due to
inadequate intellectual property protection.0
Once a pirate has appropriated a trademark, a company may
regain control of it by bringing a legal action against the pirate or
paying the pirate. Either method is likely to be expensive.
13. The common law system comes from England. Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and
Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419,421 (1967). Common
law courts are bound by precedent, and cases are tried before juries. Id. at 425, 430.
The civil law system, on the other hand, is based on old Roman law. Id. at 420. In
civil law courts, cases are tried before judges. Id. Precedent generally is not binding
because the main source of law is legislation or the codes. Id. at 424, 426.
14. Jill S. Riola, Worldwide Trademark Law Changes Create New Opportunities for
International Protection, 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 10 (1995).
15. Thomas J. Hoffman, International Trademark Practice, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON
TRADEMARK LAW 1995, at 247, 254 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary
Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 410, 1995).
16. Id.; Riola, supra note 14.
17. Hoffman, supra note 15, at 254.
18. Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, The Changing Landscape of International
Trademark Law, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 433, 433 (1993-94). Parties can
register a trademark in 173 countries. Hoffman, supra note 15, at 252.
19. Hoffman, supra note 15, at 252.
20. Gary M. Hoffman et al., Commercial Piracy of Intellectual Property, 71 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 556, 556-57 (1989).
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Lawsuits can last four to five years until final resolution.21 In
addition, many foreign countries have lax enforcement?' and
corrupt legal systems, making it difficult to obtain a fair determi-
nation through litigation.
B. Reasons Behind Latin America's Lagging Efforts to Provide
Protection
For many reasons, Latin America provides inadequate
protection of intellectual property. The main reasons are
economic and social.
1. Economic Reasons
Developing countries, such as those in Latin America, are
unwilling to increase intellectual property protection for economic
reasons. They need access to Western intellectual property to
facilitate their development, and they believe that enforcing
intellectual property rights will impede that development.24
Developing countries fear that expanding protection will allow
corporations to establish global monopolies, leading to an increase
in the price of goods.'
Developing countries have these fears because'they are
"importers," as opposed to "creators" of technology.26 Because
technology is not created within the country, it must either be
imported or pirated. Importation and increased protection bring
increased costs,27 such as: royalty payments to the creator;2 set-
up costs for enforcement agencies;29 and loss of local business
because companies devoted to piracy must close or open businesses
elsewhere."0 In addition, foreign licensors have superior bargain-
21. Alves, supra note 7.
22. Smith, supra note 3, at 556.
23. Rob Guth et al., S.O.S. (Save Our Software); Government Corruption, Mob Activity
and Social Problems Fuel International Piracy. But I.S. Vendors and Foreign Users Are
Fighting Back, COMPUTERWORLD, July 31, 1995, at 87.
24. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward
a New Multilateralism, 76 IOwA L REv. 273, 283 (1991).
25. Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 121 (1993).
26. Carlos A.P. Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT:
A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 256 (1989).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 257. See also Gutterman, supra note 25, at 122.
30. Braga, supra note 26, at 256.
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ing power, enabling them to force local companies to enter into
exploitative contracts. 31  Increased protection also makes self-
sufficiency extremely difficult for developing countries dependent
on technology importation32 because developing countries lack the
necessary "scientific and financial infrastructure" that developed
countries possess.33 Even if a local company decides to market
locally manufactured goods, becoming established and gaining a
market share may be difficult because consumers are accustomed
to foreign goods.
2. Social Reasons
Additionally, social reasons underlie the weak protection that
developing countries provide. For example, these countries do not
have many inventors, companies, or authors urging lawmakers to
increase intellectual property protection. 5 Foreign governments
are encouraging developing countries to increase protection for the
benefit of foreign firms. Without internal lobbying, however, these
countries have little incentive, and as a result, have made little
effort to step up enforcement.36
In addition, local interest groups with political clout have
convinced the governments of developing countries that stronger
intellectual property laws are not in the countries' best interests.
Members of these interest groups include companies that manufac-
ture and sell pirated goods.37 Also, when poverty runs rampant
and drug cartels greatly influence poor governments, intellectual
property protection is not a high priority.3
C. The Importance of Intellectual Property Protection
Protection is vital to creators of intellectual property in order
to recover the costs of research and development, foster new
research, and encourage the dissemination of new knowledge.39
Without adequate protection, creators lose both income and rights
31. Leaffer, supra note 24, at 284.
32. Id. See also Gutterman, supra note 25, at 123.
33. Gutterman, supra note 25, at 121.
34. Leaffer, supra note 24, at 284.
35. Id. at 282.
36. Id.
37. Gutterman, supra note 25, at 124.
38. Guth et al., supra note 23.
39. Braga, supra note 26, at 254. See also Leaffer, supra note 24, at 277.
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to pirates who can simply copy the products and sell them at a
fraction of the price, without bearing any of the creation costs."
For example, a company may spend one million dollars creating a
computer program and sell it for one hundred dollars in the United
States. A pirate in the Far East. may sell a copy of that program
for five dollars. A company may spend millions of dollars
advertising to create name recognition, and a pirate may register
the name in another country and reap the benefits of the com-
pany's investment. If creators cannot recoup their investment,
either they pass the costs on to the consumer4 or they cease
creating intellectual products because they cannot compete.42
The creators of intellectual property are not the only losers.
Piracy causes decreased sales in U.S. products, which in turn causes
lower production and results in the loss of jobs for U.S. workers.43
Thousands of U.S. jobs are lost each year because of piracy.'
Although intellectual property piracy occurs throughout the
world, the focus has been on Asia. In February 1995, for example,
the United States ordered China to pay one billion dollars in
punitive tariffs for failing to properly enforce its intellectual
property laws.45 Although Latin America affords better protec-
tion than Asia, its intellectual property laws are not up to par! 
6
D. Piracy of Reebok's Trademarks in Latin America
Reebok has been the frequent target of pirates in Latin
America. 47  As of December 8, 1994, Reebok did not own its
trademark in Peru, Guatemala, or Venezuela." These three
countries prohibit Reebok from selling its shoes and clothing
because pirates own the Reebok trademark and the right to use the
trademark on their own products. In response, Reebok has
resorted to the courts.
40. Leaffer, supra note 24, at 280.
41. Id. at 281.
42. Id. at 280.
43. Hoffman et al., supra note 20, at 557-58.
44. A 1988 International Trade Commission study reported that inadequate protection
of intellectual property caused a loss of 5374 jobs in 43 of the U.S. companies responding.
Id. at 557.
45. Jane Bussey, Piracy Still Big Business in Developing World, THE STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Feb. 21, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 5182410.
46. Id.
47. Reebok, supra note 2.
48. Id.
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For over eight years, Reebok has been trying to reclaim its
trademark in Peru through cancellation of the pirated registra-
tion.49 Fucsa is the local Peruvian company that owns the Reebok
trademark in Peru and manufactures and sells products bearing the
Reebok logo." Because Reebok was unaware of Fucsa's registra-
tion of its trademark, Reebok was unable to file an opposition
within thirty days of registration, as Peruvian law requires.51
Reebok won the last round in the Court of Appeals, but Fucsa
appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice.'
Legal remedies, however, are limited because corruption runs
rampant in Latin America, including Peru. 3 Court documents
mysteriously disappear,5 ex parte contract is not illegal,55 and
judges are bribed.50 Some feel that the laws adequately protect
intellectual property but that corruption is the more serious
problem.57 Others feel that the laws are inadequate and that the
problem lies with enforcement. 8 Although Latin America has
made some strides in protecting intellectual property, the recently
implemented laws are not retroactive.59 Thus, a company like
Reebok finds no recourse under these laws because its injury ha.s
already occurred.' Moreover, the effects of such injury to
Reebok will continue until Reebok regains the rights to its
trademark in Latin America.
49. Telephone Interview with Marianne Alford, Intellectual Property Attorney, Reeboli
International, Ltd. (Sept. 26, 1995).
50. rd.
51. TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, at P-35 (Danielle G. Mazur ed., 4th ed.
1995).
52. Telephone Interview with Marianne Alford, supra note 49. The Peruvian Supreme
Court of Justice is analogous to the U.S. Supreme Court or a state supreme court. The
superior courts are below the Supreme Court of Justice and sit in the capitals of the judicial
districts. FEDERAL RESEARCH DVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PERU: A COUNTRY
STUDY 217 (Rex A. Hudson ed., 4th ed. 1993) [hereinafter PERU]. The courts of first in-
stance sit in provincial capitals and include civil, criminal, and special branches. Id.
Finally, justices of the peace sit in all local centers. Id.
53. PERU, supra note 52, at 217-18; Guth et al., supra note 23.
54. Guth et al., supra note 23.
55. Telephone Interview with Marianne Alford, supra note 49.
56. Id.
57. Guth et al., supra note 23.
58. Leaffer, supra note 24, at 275.
59. For example, the Andean Pact countries, which include Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador,
Bolivia, and Columbia, recently enacted the Andean Pact Decisions, which have enhanced
intellectual property protection in these countries. See ifta notes 115-34 and accompany-
ing text.
60. Reebok, supra note 2.
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III. EFFORTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, LATIN
AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES TO CURB TRADEMARK
PIRACY
The international community, Latin America, and the United
States have made efforts to curb trademark piracy. The interna-
tional community has responded with multilateral treaties and
trade-based agreements. Latin America has responded by joining
the international treaties and agreements and by implementing new
laws. The U.S. has enacted statutory retaliatory measures and
provides access to U.S. federal courts.
A. Efforts by the International Community to Curb Trademark
Piracy
For years, the international community has been encouraging
better protection for trademarks and other forms of intellectual
property through international treaties, including the Paris
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. The Paris Convention is
the predominant international trademark treaty;6 its purpose is
to protect intellectual property worldwide."2
1. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
The Paris Convention went into force in 1884.' As of May
61. The Paris Convention is an international, multilateral treaty. A multilateral treaty
is one with more than two members and provides benefits to its members.
62. Leaffer, supra note 24, at 293.
63. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (Marshall A. Leaffer
ed., 1990) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TREATIES]. The Paris Convention concluded on
March 20, 1883 and was originally signed by eleven states. Id. The Convention has been
revised many times since 1883. The last revision took place in Stockholm in 1967. Id. at
17.
The Paris Convention covers many forms of intellectual property, including: "patents,
utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of
source of appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair competition." Paris
Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(2), 21 U.S.T. at 1630, 828 U.N.T.S. at 309. This Note
focuses only on the provisions relating to trademarks.
The members of the Paris Convention comprise a Union. The Union consists of three
governing bodies that carry out the aims of the Convention. These bodies are the
Assembly, the Executive Committee, and the International Bureau of WIPO (World
Intellectual Property Organization). The Assembly is made up of one delegate from each
member country and serves as the main governing body. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES,
supra, at 17. See also Paris Convention, supra note 12, art. 13, 21 U.S.T. at 1650-53, 828
U.N.T.S. at 341-45. The Assembly elects the Executive Committee. INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES, supra, at 17. See also Paris Convention, supra note 12, art. 14(2)(a), 21 U.S.T.
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1, 1993, 109 countries were party to the Paris Convention."
Venezuela and Peru acceded to the Paris Convention in 1993 and
1995, respectively.65
The purpose of the Paris Convention is to protect industrial
property and to promote uniformity in industrial property law.
6
An additional function is to form "special agreements" among
member countries, so long as they do not contravene the provisions
of the Paris Convention. A
Three principles form the basis of the Paris Convention:
national treatment, right of priority, and minimum rights. National
treatment means that citizens of any country in the Union are
entitled to the same rights and advantages as nationals in all other
member countries with regard to &rotection of intellectual property
and remedies for infringement. This concept also applies to
nationals of non-Union countries who live or own businesses in a
member country.69 National treatment avoids the problems of
reciprocity where -a country will protect nationals of another
country only to the degree that their own nationals are protected
in that other country." This principle simplifies intellectual
at 1653, 828 U.N.T.S. at 345. The. International Bureau performs the administrative tasks
of the Union. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, supra, at 17. See also Paris Convention, supra
note 12, art. 15(1)(a), 21 U.S.T. at 1655, 828 U.N.T.S. at 349. WIPO administers most of
the major treaties. The United Nations established WIPO in 1967, and its headquarters
is located in Geneva. Leaffer, supra note 24, at 292.
64. la JEROmE GILSON & JEFFREY M. SAMuELS, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND
PRAcrICE § 9.06[1] (1995).
65. Peru acceded to the Paris Convention in April 1995. USTR Announcement on
Foreign Government Procurement (Title VII) and Intellectual Property Protection (Special
301), 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 800 (May 3, 1995) [hereinafter USTR An-
nouncement]. Venezuela acceded in 1994. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1995 NATIONAL
TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 258, 316 (1995) [hereinafter
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT].
66. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, supra note 63, at 5.
67. Paris Convention, supra note 12, art. 19, 21 U.S.T. at 1660, 828 U.N.T.S. at 357.
Trademark agreements formed as a result of Article 19 include: the Madrid Agreement
Concerning the International Registratiori of Marks; the Trademark Registration Treaty;
the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for
the Purposes of the Registration of Marks; the Vienna Agreement Establishing an Interna-
tional Classification of the Figurative Elements of Marks; the Madrid Agreement for the
Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods; and the Lisbon
Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International
Registration. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, supra note 63, at 7 n.10.
68. Paris Convention, supra note 12, art. 2,21 U.S.T. at 1631, 828 U.N.T.S. at 313.
69. Id. art. 3, 21 U.S.T. at 1631, 828 U.N.T.S. at 313.
70. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, supra note 63, at 7.
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property relations among member countries because it eliminates
the need to negotiate or maintain bilateral agreements.
71
The right of priority rule provides that any person who has
filed an application for trademark registration in any country of the
Union has a six-month right of priority in other member countries.
Thus, if a person files an application in another member country
within this six-month period, the effective filing date is the original
filing date.' For example, a company that files in the United
States has six months to file abroad in countries that are members
of the Paris Convention. Any applications filed within the six-
month period are dated as of the U.S. filing date. Although the
Paris Convention does not provide for a centralized registration
system, the priority rule is beneficial because it gives trademark
owners a six-month window in which to register without fear that
a pirate will appropriate the trademark.
The Paris Convention also establishes minimum rights that
each member country must observe. These minimum rights are
substantive standards that member countries must incorporate into
their respective national laws.73 Two important reasons exist for
these minimum standards:.(1) to avoid imbalances that the national
treatment principle creates; and (2) to eventually unify the laws in
each member country.74 Articles 6 through 11 set out the guide-
lines for trademarks.75
The two most important articles of the Paris Convention for
the protection of trademarks are Article 6 is and Article 1 0bi" .
Article 6 bs requires a member country to refuse or to cancel an
unauthorized registration by a party other than the rightful owner
when a mark is well-known.76 Article 10 bis provides an alternate
71. Id. at 8.
72. Paris Convention, supra note 12, art. 4, 21 U.S.T. at 1631-35, 828 U.N.T.S. at 313-
19.
73. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, supra note 63, at 8.
74. Id. at 8-9.
75. Paris Convention, supra note 12, art. 6-11, 21 U.S.T. at 1639-49, 828 U.N.T.S. at
325-39.
76. Article 6b1(l) provides:
The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so permits, or
at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and
to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation,
or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent
authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that country
as being already the mark of a person entitled to benefits of this Convention and
used for identical or similar goods.
[Vol. 18:671
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remedy-an action for unfair competition-to cancel an unautho-
rized registration of a well-known trademark.77 The true owner
of a trademark can claim that the unauthorized trademark misleads
consumers into believing they are buying genuine goods.7'
The Paris Convention, however, has several shortcomings.
The main problem is that protection is only as good as the laws in
the member country where parties seek protection for their
intellectual property." For example, with regard to national
treatment, the Paris Convention only requires a member country
to provide nationals of other countries the same level of protection
it provides to its own citizens. Thus, if the intellectual property
laws in a country are inadequate or non-existent, the Paris
Convention will not provide protection. In addition, the Paris
Convention does not provide protection across Union members'
borders.80 As a result, trademark owners must register in each
country where they want to do business and rely on the laws of
that country for protection.
Also, each country has its own standard for determining
whether a mark is well-known. As such, one member country may
consider a trademark well-known while another member country
may not, even if the mark is well-known internationally." For
example, the standard in Peru to determine if a trademark is well-
known or notorious requires evidence of its notoriety. Evidence
of notoriety may include: filing copies of foreign trademark
registrations worldwide in many different classes; demonstrating
extensive international advertisement of the trademark, including
some advertisement in Peru; and showing a connection between the
goods protected in the opposed application and the goods protect-
ed in the registration of the well-known mark.' Such a standard
id. art. 6b"(1), 21 U.S.T. at 1640, 828 U.N.T.S. at 325.
77. Article 10&(3) prohibits "all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any
means whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial
activities, of a competitor." Id. art. 10bb(3)1, 21 U.S.T. at 1648, 828 U.N.T.S. at 337.
78. Masterson, supra note 1, at 351.
79. Harriet R. Freeman, Reshaping Trademark Protection in Today's Global Village:
Looking Beyond GATT's Uruguay Round Toward Global Trademark Harmonization and
Centralization, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 67, 74 (1995).
80. See Minde G. Browning, International Trademark Law: A Pathfinder and Selected
Bibliography, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 339, 341 (1994).
81. Masterson, supra note 1, at 350.
82. Stephen Bigger & Barbara L. Kagedan, Peru" Opposition Proceeding Involving
Well-Known Trademark, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 423,429 (1986).
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may be difficult to meet.
These aspects of the Paris Convention cause trouble for a
company like Reebok. As previously noted, Peru and Venezuela
recently became members of the Paris Convention. As such, none
of the protections available in the Paris Convention are available
to Reebok because the provisions are not retroactive. Even if they
were retroactive, and if Peru and Venezuela were members of the
Union when the pirates appropriated Reebok's trademark, Reebok
would still face a difficult fight. The trademark laws in Latin
America do not provide a great deal of protection, and Reebok
would be limited to this level of protection.
Although the Paris Convention may have its shortcomings, it
represents the international community's first attempt to protect
intellectual property.
2. The TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS Agreement13 is the most recent attempt at
intellectual property protection. Unlike the Paris Convention, the
TRIPS Agreement utilizes the trade-based approach to increasing
intellectual property protection. By implementing new intellectual
property laws in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, countries
can benefit from the trade provisions in GATT. The problem with
multilateral treaties and the TRIPS Agreement, however, is that
gaps exist and/or not all countries are parties to the agreements.
GATT came into existence after World War II. Negotiations
between the twenty-three signatory countries concluded in October
1947, and GATT went into effect on January 1, 1948.84 The
purpose of GATT was to reduce tariffs and to limit the use of
trade restrictions. 5  Five principles underlie the GAIT agree-
ment: (1) the most favored nation principle, which requires
contracting parties to give benefits available to citizens to all
contracting parties; (2) the national treatment principle, which
prohibits the imposition of higher taxes or more burdensome
regulation on imported products; (3) the tariff concession principle,
which requires maintaining customs duties at the levels specified in
the party's latest filed schedule; (4) the principle against nontariff
barriers, which restrains contracting parties from erecting nontariff
83. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10.
84. Freeman, supra note 79, at 84; Leaffer, supra note 24, at 298.
85. Freeman, supra note 79, at 85.
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barriers that restrict trade; and (5) the fair trade principle, which
enables contracting parties to protect local businesses from unfair
trade practices through the use of reasonable, proportionate tariff
measures and which discourages the promotion of exports through
subsidies and dumping.
86
Since 1947, there have been seven rounds of GAT" negotia-
tion.' Delegates first discussed the protection of intellectual
property during the sixth round in Tokyo. The discussions,
however, focused only on trademark counterfeiting.8 GATT
finally provided protection for all forms of intellectual property
with the passage of the TRIPS Agreement during the Uruguay
round.89
The Uruguay Round of GATT began on September 20,
1986,' 0 ended on December 15, 1993,91 and resulted in GAT
1994.9 One hundred seventeen countries signed the agreement
on April 15, 1994.93 The governing body of GATT 1994 is the
World Trade Organization (WTO).94 GAT 1994 includes the
TRIPS Agreement, which provides minimum standards for the
protection of intellectual property, including trademarks. The
general provisions of the TRIPS Agreement follow the Paris
Convention, which protects many forms of industrial property,
including trademarks.
The Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement provide for
national treatment and most favored nation treatment.95 As
previously discussed, national treatment requires each signatory
country to give nationals of other member countries the same
86. Leaffer, supra note 24, at 299. See also Freeman, supra note 79, at 85.
87. The seven rounds are: Annecy (1949). Tourquay (1950), Geneva (1956), Dillon
(1961), Kennedy (1962-67), Tokyo (1973-79), and Uruguay (1986-93). The first five rounds
focused on the reduction of tariffs for trade in goods. The sixth round focused on dispute
resolution and the reduction of nontariffs for trade in goods. Freeman, supra note 79, at
85.
88. Id.; Leaffer, supra note 24, at 300-01.
89. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10.
90. Samuels & Samuels, supra note 18, at 435.
91. Freeman, supra note 79, at 86.
92. GATT 1994, supra note 11.
93. Id. at 90.
94. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (Dec. 15,
1993) [hereinafter WTO Agreement], reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND,"
supra note 10, at 2-18; 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144-53 (1994).
95. Paris Convention, supra note 12, arts. 2-3, 21 U.S.T. at 1631, 828 U.N.T.S. at 305,
313. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, arts. 3(1), 4.
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treatment afforded its own citizens.96  Most favored nation
treatment requires each signatory country to give all member
countries "any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity" regarding
intellectual property it grants to nationals of another country.97
The TRIPS Agreement provides for certain trademark rights
in articles 15 to 17.98 Article 15 defines a trademark as "[a]ny
sign... capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one
undertaking from those of other undertakings." 99 Article 16(1)
states that the owner of a trademark has the exclusive right to-
prevent others from using an identical or similar mark in trade
when such use would lead to confusion. 100 Article 16(2) lays out
how to determine whether a trademark is well-known, stating,
"[a]ccount shall be taken of the knowledge of the trademark in the
relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in that Member
obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark."''1
Article 17, however, allows member countries to provide limited
exceptions to trademark rights if the countries take into account
the interests of the owner and third parties."°2
Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement provides additional
trademark requirements. Article 20 prohibits a member country
from "unjustifiably encumbering" a trademark with special re-
quirements such as compelling use of the trademark with another
trademark, use of the trademark in a special form, or use in a
manner that hinders the ability to distinguish the goods and
services of the trademark owner from goods and services of
othersW' A member country can require a trademark owner to
identify the producer of goods or services along with, but not
linked to, a trademark distinguishing the goods or services of the
producer. °4
While the TRIPS Agreement has many benefits, it also has
96. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 3.
97. Id. art. 4.
98. Id. arts. 15-17.
99. Id. art. 15(1).
100. Id. art. 16(1).
101. Id. art. 16(2). Additionally, Article 16 requires that each member country apply
Article 6bf of the Paris Convention to services and to goods and services that are not
similar to those that the owner of the trademark distributes if use of the trademark would
indicate a connection and would damage the owner. Id. art. 16(2)-(3).
102. Id. art. 17.
103. Id. art. 20.
104. Id.
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drawbacks. One benefit for a company like Reebok is that many
Latin American countries, including Peru and Venezuela, are
signatories to GATT 1994.15 Thus, these countries have agreed
to implement legislation in compliance with the standards of the
TRIPS Agreement. The biggest problem with the TRIPS Agree-
ment is the gap in protection resulting from the grace period. The
TRIPS Agreement gives developing countries, including those in
Latin America, up to five years to comply with the provisions of
the agreement.1°9 Developed countries have a one-year grace
period to implement the TRIPS Agreement and developing
countries get an extra four years.1 Consequently, pirates in
developing countries, such as Peru and Venezuela, can continue to
prosper until the new laws take effect.
Another problem for a company like Reebok is that the
TRIPS Agreement is not retroactive." For example, the GATT
1994 cannot assist Reebok in its present struggle to regain the
rights to its trademark in those countries because a pirate has
already registered Reebok's trademark in certain Latin American
countries.
In addition, the signatories to the TRIPS Agreement need not
require use of a trademark prior to registration. Actual use of a
trademark is not a condition for filing an application. 9 Without
a use requirement, the first party to file a trademark in the
registration office obtains the rights to the trademark, unless the
true owner can oppose or cancel the registration. Absence of a use
requirement may not be a significant problem for companies with
internationally well-known trademarks, such as Reebok, because
the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention provide better
protection for well-known or notorious marks. In its efforts in
Peru, however, Reebok cannot benefit from such trademark
provisions of the Paris Convention or the TRIPS Agreement for
two reasons: neither is retroactive, and Peru only recently became
a member of the Paris Convention.n °
105. See NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 65, at 316.
106. Intellectual Property Core to GATT Deal, SCREEN DIG. (Information Access Co.),
Jan. 1,1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 2694599. See also Freeman, supra note 79,
at 91.
107. Freeman, supra note 79, at 91.
108. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 70(1). See also Reebok, supra note 2.
109. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 15(3).
110. USTR Announcement, supra note 65, at 800.
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Nevertheless, the TRIPS Agreement has afforded increased
protection to intellectual property. For example, member countries
cannot require foreign companies to link their trademarks with
indigenous marks of local firms,"' impose on foreign trademark
owners compulsory licenses that would give local companies the
right to use the mark,"' or deny trademark owners the right to
assign the trademark.' In addition, the TRIPS Agreement
increases the protection that the Paris' Convention grants to
trademarks. Article 6' of the Paris Convention now covers
services and goods and services that are not similar to those
marketed by the trademark's true owner."4
The TRIPS Agreement is a step in the right direction for
intellectual property protection because it requires member
countries to implement new laws to protect all forms of intellectual
property in order to benefit from GAIT 1994's trade provisions.
B. Efforts by Latin America to Curb Trademark Piracy
Protection of intellectual property has improved in Latin
America. Many Latin American countries have become members
of GAIT 1994, which requires these countries to implement
intellectual property laws that meet the standards set forth in the
TRIPS Agreement. In addition, several countries have recently
acceded to the Paris Convention. The Andean Pact Decisions
represent the best evidence of increased protection for trademarks
and other forms of intellectual property.
The Andean Pact originated in 1969 with the Agreement on
Andean Subregional Integration, better known as the Cartagena
Agreement."5 The Andean Pact is a free trade agreement
111. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 20. See also J.H. Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under TRIPS Component of the
WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345, 362-63 (1995).
112. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 21. See also Reichman, supra note 111, at
363.
113. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 21. See also Reichman, supra note 111, at
363.
114. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 16(2)-(3).
115. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, opened for signature May 26,1969,
translated in 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969) [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement]. See also Paul W.
Moore & Rebecca K. Hunt, The Andean Pact: In the Forefront of the Intefration
Movement, Bus. AM., May 1, 1994, at 10; Mark Greenberg, Comment, Recent Develop-
ments in Latin American Intellectual Property Law: The Venezuelan Response to Andean
Pact Decision 313, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 131, 138 (1993).
The original members of the Pact were Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
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intended to promote economic growth and to create a regional
common market among its members." 6  The Andean Pact
Decisions address protection for intellectual property, although the
member countries have always been and remain opposed to such
protection."7
The history of the Andean Pact Decisions demonstrates the
member countries' slow progress toward providing protection for
intellectual property. In 1970, the Andean Pact enacted Decision
24, which regulated "foreign investment and technology trans-
fer.' 18  In 1974, Decisions 84 and 85 passed.119  Decision 84
called for regional technological development. 2 ' Decision 85
dealt specifically with industrial property, including trademarks.'
On May 18, 1987, members of the Andean Pact ratified Decision
220, which replaced Decision 24.1' Decision 220 required each
country to draft its own laws for technology transfer and foreign
investment. When Decision 220 did not succeed, the Andean Pact
approved Decision 291 in March 1991 to replace Decision 220."z
This change signified a return to the liberalism that existed prior
to Decision 24.
On February 14, 1992, the Andean Pact passed Decision
313.124 The trademark provisions provided for the registration of
trade and service marks"z and for the protection of notorious
marks subject to reciprocity. 126 Decision 313 also permitted
Andean Pact members to join international conventions, which was
prohibited under Decision 85.1'7
The current laws are Decisions 344, 345, and 351 that went
Venezuela joined in 1973, and Chile withdrew in 1976. Moore & Hunt, supra, at 10.
116. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 115, art. 1. See also Moore & Hunt, supra note
115; Greenberg, supra note 115, at 139.
117. Greenberg, supra note 115, at 139.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 142.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 143.
123. Id. at 144.
124. Id. at 145.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 145-46.
127. Andean Group: Commission Decision 313-Common Code on Intellectual
Property, Feb. 6, 1992, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 180, 207 (1993).
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into effect on January 1, 1994.128 Decisions 344 and 345 cover
patents and trademarks, and Decision 351 covers copyrights. The
new provisions relating to trademarks include extending protection
to well-known marks in other Andean Pact countries129 and
expanding the trademark registration system in member coun-
tries."0
Although the Andean Pact countries have increased protection
for intellectual property, the Decisions do not meet the re-
quirements of the TRIPS Agreement."' For example, Decision
344 does not give a great deal of protection to unregistered marks
because no international, well-known trademark register exists." 2
In fact, the Trademark Office in Peru has allowed the registration
of trademarks that infringe upon internationally well-known trade-
marks."' Thus, registration is still the best protection against
pirates. In addition, the Andean Pact Decisions do not provide
procedures for enforcing intellectual property rights."14 Neverthe-
less, the Andean Pact Decisions have made positive strides.
Decision 313 now allows for Andean Pact countries to join
international conventions. Consequently, Peru and Venezuela have
become members of the Paris Convention, which has increased
protection for intellectual property.
Although intellectual property protection has improved in the
Andean Pact countries, Reebok has not benefitted from these new
laws. Reebok filed suit against Fucsa in Peru eight years ago, long
before implementation of the new Andean Pact Decisions. As a
result, Reebok and companies similarly situated have been forced
to rely on corrupt governments to enforce antiquated intellectual
property laws. Even if Reebok could make use of the new laws,
the limitations of these laws still result in inadequate protection for
128. Andean Pact Decision Changes IP Laws, 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 40 (1994)
[hereinafter Andean Pact Decision]; Moore & Hunt, supra note 115; Decision No.
344-Common Provisions on Industrial Property (Jan. 1, 1994), compiled in 8 INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY LAWS AND TREATIES, at Multilateral Treaties-Text 1-012 n.* (World Intell.
Prop. Org. No. 609(E), Mar. 1994).
129. Moore & Hunt, supra note 115; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WORLD DESK
REFERENCE, at Peru-l, Peru-3 (Thomas M.S. Hemnes et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter IP
WORLD DESK REFERENCE].
130. Andean Pact Decision, supra note 128.
131. Moore & Hunt, supra note 115.
132. IP WORLD DESK REFERENCE, supra note 129, at Peru-3.
133. Id.
134. NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 65, at 259, 316.
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intellectual property.
C. US. Efforts to Curb Trademark Piracy
The United States has made an effort to protect U.S. trade-
marks in foreign countries. The United States can threaten to
impose trade sanctions on countries who do not provide adequate
protection for intellectual property. U.S. companies can also bring
suit against infringers in federal court.
1. "Special" 301 of the 1988 Trade Act
The United States does encourage foreign countries to
enhance intellectual property protection. In 1988, the United
States enacted the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 (1988 Trade Act) which amended the Trade Act of 1974
(1974 Trade Act).3 ' The 1988 Trade Act amended Section 301
of the 1974 Trade Act in order to provide better protection for
intellectual property.'36 "Special" 301 of the 1988 Trade Act is
the portion that relates to intellectual property. The aim of
"Special" 301 is to encourage protection of intellectual property
rights in foreign countries by threatening the imposition of trade
sanctions in retaliation for inadequate protection.
137
"Special" 301 requires the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) to identify within thirty days after the submission of the
National Trade Estimate Report to Congress. foreign countries that
"(A) deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights, or (B) deny fair and equitable market access to
United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protec-
tion.""' The USTR may identify countries that deny adequate
protection or market access as "priority foreign countries."'"!
135. Masterson, supra note 1, at 356. Section 301 is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
See also Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301": Its Requirements, Implementa-
tion, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259,259 (1989-90); Jean H. Grier, Section
301 and Its Future Use With the Uruguay Round Agreements, in 1 THE COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTELLECIUAL TRADE & INVESTMENT 1994, supra note 1, at
171, 173.
136. Three forms of Section 301 now exist: (1) "Super" 301; (2) "Special" 301; and (3)
Telecommunications 301. See Grier, supra note 135, at 176-77.
137. Id. at 173. See also Bello & Holmer, supra note 135, at 259.
138. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1) (1994).
139. Id. § 2242(a)(2). The USTR may find a country denies "adequate and effective
protection" of intellectual property even if that country is in compliance with the provisions
of the TRIPS Agreement. Id. § 2242(d)(4).
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Priority foreign countries are those: (1) "that have the most
onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices; ' 140 (2) "whose
acts, policies or practices... have the greatest adverse impact
(actual or potential) on the relevant United States products;
141
and (3) "that are not... entering into good faith negotiations,
or... making significant progress in bilateral or multilateral
negotiations, to provide adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights. '  The USTR also maintains a
"priority watch list" and a "watch list" as an alternative to naming
countries as "priority foreign countries" under "Special" 301. 4
The USTR places a country on the priority watch or watch list
when a country has particularly lax intellectual property protection
or imposes barriers to market access.44
Once the USTR determines the priority foreign couritries, it
initiates an investigation.145 The USTR has six to nine months,
depending on the complexity of the case, to complete its investiga-
tion and to negotiate bilateral solutions.146  If the "acts, policies
or practices" continue, the USTR has the authority to retaliate by:
(1) suspending, withdrawing, or preventing application of trade
concessions; 147 (2) imposing duties or other import restric-
tions;141 or (3) entering into binding agreements that require the
countries to eliminate the offending practices.149  The USTR's
power to retaliate may be mandatory or discretionary depending
upon the act, policy, or practice being investigated."'
Many Latin American countries are either on the "priority
140. Id. § 2242(b)(1)(A).
141. Id. § 2242(b)(1)(B).
142. Id. § 2242(b)(1)(C).
143. Bello & Holmer, supra note 135, at 267.
144. Id.
145. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2) (1994).
146. Id. § 2414(a)(3)(A)-(B).
147. Id. § 2411(c)(1)(A).
148. Id. § 2411(c)(1)(B).
149. Id. § 2411(c)(1)(D).
150. See id. § 2411(a)-(b). Action is mandatory when an act, policy, or practice: (1)
"violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the
United States under, any trade agreement;" or (2) "is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts
United States commerce." Id. Action is discretionary when an act, policy, or practice "is
unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce." Id. See
also Bello & Holmer, supra note 135, at 262.
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watch list" or the "watch list." ' The USTR placed Peru on the
"Special" 301 watch list in 1992, and it remained on the list in 1993,
1994, and 1995.152 Despite Peru's new industrial property rights
law, which it passed in 1992 in response to Andean Pact Decision
313, and despite the newest Andean Pact Decisions, which
supersede the 1992 law,153 Peru remains on the watch list because
the Andean Pact Decisions fail to adequately enforce intellectual
property rights.' 54 Moreover, corruption in the courts hampers
any enforcement measures,155 and jurisdictional problems exist
between the Peruvian justice system and the National Institute for
the Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property
(INDECOPI).5 6 Finally, the Peruvian government still needs to
improve its efforts against piracy.57
Venezuela is also on the "Special" 301 watch list.58 Because
Venezuela is an Andean Pact nation, the recent Decisions have
increased intellectual property protection within the country, but
problems still exist. The USTR did not upgrade Venezuela to the
priority watch list because it passed a new copyright law in
1993.2"9 The Venezuelan government, however, has not imple-"
mented the new law, so the United States continues to monitor its
implementation, as well as recently enacted provisions for expedit-
ed patent and trademark applications.' 6°
2. Other U.S. Efforts to Curb Trademark Piracy
The United States can help a trademark owner whose mark
has been infringed in other ways. Trademark owners can utilize
151. The Latin American countries on the watch list are: Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela. Brazil is on the priority watch
list. USTR Announcement, supra note 65, at 795-98.
152. NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 65, at 258; USTR Announce-
ment, supra note 65, at 796, 797.
153. NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 65, at 258-59.
154. Id. at 259.
155. Guth et al., supra note 23.
156. NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 65, at 259. INDECOPI was
created in 1992. Id. For the text of the Law on the Organization and Functions of the
National Institute for the Defense of Competition and Intellectual Property Protection
(INDECOPI), see 5 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS AND TREATIES, at Peru-Text 1-002
(World Intell. Prop. Org. No. 609(E), Mar. 1995).
157. USTR Announcement, supra note 65, at 797.
158. Id. at 798; NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 65, at 316.
159. NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 65, at 316.
160. USTR Announcement, supra note 65, at 798.
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the U.S. federal courts to protect their rights, so long as the court
has subject matter jurisdiction."" A U.S. court can obtain
jurisdiction over a trademark infringer in three ways. First, if a
U.S. court has personal jurisdiction that subjects the person to U.S.
trademark law, the court also has subject matter jurisdiction when
a foreign national labels and imports goods with an infringing mark
into the United States.162 Second, a court has subject matter
jurisdiction under the Lanham Act" when the activity is within
a U.S. foreign trade zone." A foreign trade zone is a govern-
ment-bonded warehouse where imported goods are stored,
iepacked, and relabeled.'65 Third, U.S. courts may have subject
matter jurisdiction through the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham
Act. The Lanham Act applies when a foreign national's activities
indirectly affect commerce between the United States and foreign
countries.t 66
In 1952, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the landmark case
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,67 which discussed the extraterritorial
reach of the Lanham Act. In Bulova Watch, the defendant bought
watch parts in the United States, shipped the parts to Mexico for
assembly, and later sold the watches with the "Bulova" mark.
Although the defendant did not import or sell the watches in the
United States, U.S. consumers bought these watches in Mexico,
thinking they were genuine, and brought them back to the United
States.'~ The plaintiff, Bulova Watch Co., brought suit in the
United States after receiving complaints from jewelers when the
Mexican-made watches were brought in for repair. The Court had
personal jurisdiction over the case because the defendant was a
U.S. citizen. The Court also broadly interpreted the Lanham
Act 69 and determined it had subject matter jurisdiction under the
act because the defendant's "operations and their effects were not
161. Smith, supra note 3, at 556.
162. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29.24[1]
(3d ed. 1995); John F. Sweeney et al., Using U.S. Courts and International Treaties to
Protect Against Infringement Abroad, and at Home, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, at 9, 18.
163. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1073 (1994).
164. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 162, § 29.24[1]; Sweeney et al., supra note 162, at 19.
165. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 162, § 29.24[1].
166. Smith, supra note 3, at 556.
167. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
168. Id. at 284-85.
169. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 162, § 29.24[2].
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confined within the territorial limits of a foreign nation."170
Other courts have since interpreted Bulova Watch. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Vanity Fair Mills v. T Eaton
Co.171 created a three-part test to determine whether a court has
subject matter jurisdiction through the extraterritorial reach of the
Lanham Act: (1) the defendant's conduct must substantially affect
U.S. commerce; (2) the defendant must be a U.S. citizen; and (3)
there cannot be a conflict with the trademark rights conferred by
the foreign country, meaning there cannot be a valid registration
in the foreign country.'7 The Vanity Fair Mills court derived this
test from Bulova Watch.1
73
The Ninth Circuit also developed a test for acquiring subject
matter jurisdiction under the guise of the Lanham Act in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.74 The Timberlane
three-part test requires: (1) some effect on U.S. foreign commerce;
(2) the effect must be sufficiently great to injure a plaintiff in
violation of federal law; and (3) the impact on U.S. commerce must
be sufficiently great in relation to the impact on other nations to
justify extraterritorial jurisdiction.1"
Although U.S. courts provide remedies to U.S. companies
whose trademarks have been infringed abroad, resorting to U.S.
courts is not a viable remedy for Reebok because the courts cannot
obtain subject matter jurisdiction in any of the three ways discussed
above.'76  First, Fucsa does not export their counterfeits,17
Although Fucsa does not import or sell these "legal" counterfeits
in the United States, they may reach the United States when U.S.
citizens return from visits to Peru. If Fucsa imported its goods into
the United States, they could be seized, and a U.S. court might be
able to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over the Peruvian
company.7 8 A US. court, however, would have a difficult time
obtaining personal jurisdiction over Fucsa because it is a foreign
company that does not import goods into the United States.
170. Bulova-Watch, 344 U.S. at 286.
171. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
172. Id. at 642. See also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 162, § 29.24[3].
173. Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 642. See also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 162,
§ 29.24[3).
174. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
175. Id. at 613. See also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 162, § 29.24[3].
176. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
177. Telephone Interview with Marianne Alford, supra note 49.
178. Id.
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Second, there is no activity in a U.S. foreign trade zone. Third, the
court cannot justify extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act
to reach Fucsa's activities under either the Vanity Fair Mills or
Timberlane tests.
Reebok could not use Vanity Fair Mills to bring suit because
Fucsa is not a U.S. company and because Fucsa has a valid
trademark in Peru. Also, Reebok would have difficulty arguing
that Fucsa's activities in Peru have a substantial effect on U.S.
commerce. Although Reebok is losing money in Peru, the effect
on U.S. commerce is tenuous. Using the Vanity Fair Mills test, a
New York court found that the Lanham Act did not apply to a
foreign national whose activities were solely within his home
country.179 Under the Timberlane test, as well, Reebok would
also lose because the court would lack personal jurisdiction and
there would only be minimal effects on U.S. commerce.
IV. THE BEST SOLUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL REGISTRY
The appropriation of Reebok's trademark in Latin America
and the inability of Reebok to regain its trademark demonstrate
the inadequacy of the current methods of protection for interna-
tional trademarks; however, the framework for increased protection
is in place. The best solution to trademark piracy is an internation-
al registration system based on the Protocol Relating to the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks
(Madrid Protocol) 1 ° used in conjunction with GAIT 1994 and
the TRIPS Agreement, which incorporates the Paris Convention.
A. Development of International Registration
There have been previous attempts at international registra-
tion. The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks (Madrid Agreement),81 adopted in 1891,
represents the first such attempt. As of May 1, 1993, thirty-five
179. C. Cure Chem. Co. v. Secure Adhesives Corp., 571 F. Supp. 808, 821 (W.D.N.Y.
1983).
180., Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration
of Marks, adopted June 28, 1989, 9 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS AND TREATIES, at
Multilateral Treaties-Text 3-007 (World Intell. Prop. Org. No. 609(E), July/Aug. 1989)
[hereinafter Madrid ProtocolJ.
181. The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks,
adopted Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 (1977) [hereinafter Madrid Agreement].
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countries were party to the Madrid Agreement. '2 Peru, Vene-
zuela, and the United States are not presently members."s
The Madrid Agreement allows for the international registra-
tion of an approved trademark with the International Bureau of
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which is the
governing body of the Madrid Agreement."8 The agreement also
provides for a single filing in one language with one fee."s
Procedurally, the Madrid Agreement requires registration of the
trademark in the country of origin 86 before allowing entry in the
international register 1 '7 As a result, the Madrid Agreement
favors countries with the least exacting requirements for registra-
tion. For this reason, many countries, including the United States,
have chosen not to become members of the Madrid Agree-
ment.188
Other factors account for the small membership to the
agreement. One such factor is that if a country wishes to refuse a
trademark registration, it must do so within a twelve-month
period t89 Many countries find a year to be too short because
approval is a long process."9  Another factor is the "central
attack" provision, which requires protection to end after a suc-
cessful attack on a registration within the first five years.191 The
United States, in particular, finds fault with the "central attack"
provision because other member countries do not recognize many
of the grounds available to attack a U.S. registration. 192 The
Madrid Agreement is not universally accepted because many
countries have found fault with it. The international community,
however, continues its efforts to create an international registration
182. la GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 64, § 9.06[2].
183. See INTERNATI6NAL TREATIES, supra note 63, at 231.
184. Id. at 229.
185. Id.
186. The country of origin is "the country ... where the applicant has a real and
effective industrial or commercial establishment; if he has no such establishment... the
country ... where he has his domicile; if he has no domicile ... but is a national ... the
country of which he is a national." Madrid Agreement, supra note 181, art. 1(3), 828
U.N.T.S. at 393.
187. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, supra note 63, at 229-30.
188. Id. at 230; la GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 64, § 9.06[2].
189. See Madrid Agreement, supra note 181, art. 5, 828 U.N.T.S. at 399-401.
190. la GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 64, § 9.06[2]. See also Freeman, supra note 79,
at 77.
191. See Madrid Agreement, supra note 181, art. 6(3), 828 U.N.T.S. at 403.
192. la GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 64, § 9.06[2].
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system suitable to more countries.
The next attempt at an international register was the Trade-
mark Registration Treaty (TRT).' 93  Eight countries signed the
TRT on June 12, 1973.194 As of January 1, 1990, however, only
five countries were party to the TRT.19 The TRT's administra-
tive body is also the International Bureau of WIPO.'96 The TRT
allows direct registration with the WIPO, eliminating the Madrid
Agreement provision requiring registration in the country of
origin."9 In addition, under the TRT, a member country cannot
cancel or refuse a trademark for non-use within the first three
years.198  A member country can, however, require owners of
trademarks to state their intentions to use the mark.' 99 The
United States never ratified the TRT because the non-use
provisions would have required changes in U.S. trademark law.2 '
The international community views the TRT as a failure because
only five countries have ratified it.201 In fact, WIPO recently
decided to suspend the TRT's operations.2 '2
With the TRT's failure came the Madrid Protocol.2 °3
Although signed on June 28, 1989, the Madrid Protocol is not yet
in force.z°  The Madrid Protocol is similar to the Madrid Agree-
ment, but several changes were made in an attempt to increase
membership. First, an applicant may base international registration
on a national application as well as national registration. °'
Second, a member country may extend the period to refuse a
registration to eighteen months, as opposed to twelve months
under the Madrid Agreement.2" Third, the Madrid Protocol
eliminates the negative effects of "central attack" by allowing a
193. Trademark Registration Treaty, June 12, 1973, 63 TRADEMARK REP. 640 (1973),
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, supra note 63, at 293 [hereinafter TRT].
194. la GILSON & SAMUtLS, supra note 64, § 9.06[6].
195. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, supra note 63, at 292.
196. Id. at 291.
197. Id.; TRT, supra note 193, art. 5(2).
198. TRT, supra note 193, art. 19(3)(a).
199. Id. art. 19(4)(a).
200. la GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 64, § 9.06[6].
201. Browning, supra note 80, at 346.
202. la GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 64, § 9.06[6].
203. Madrid Protocol, supra note 180.
204. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, supra note 63, at 231. See also Freeman, supra note
79, at 84.
205. Madrid Protocol, supra note 180, art. 2(1).
206: Id. art. 5(2)(b).
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member country to transform a canceled international registration
into a national application while retaining the original filing
date.' ° Even with these improvements, only Spain has ratified
the Madrid Protocol.2 The Madrid Protocol, however, provides
a solid foundation for an international registration system.
The Madrid Agreement, the TRT, and the Madrid Protocol
have not succeeded in establishing an international registration
system for numerous reasons, including: inadequate enforcement;
lack of membership; and lack of uniform, substantive laws.
Enforcement is a problem because, under multilateral agreements,
countries can overtly disregard their duties under the treaty
without fear of sanctions.' In addition, the treaties have failed
to attract a large membership, thus defeating the purpose of an
international register. Under the existing treaties, companies like
Reebok still must register in numerous countries to obtain
protection. This is both time consuming and costly.
The current structure for an international registration system
also has not succeeded because it does not solve all the piracy
problems for international companies. The laws in many countries
remain inadequate, allowing the appropriation of trademarks. The
best solution would be an international registry as part of the
TRIPS Agreement because the TRIPS Agreement requires
member countries to make substantive changes to their laws.
B. Recommendation for an International Registration System
For successful intellectual property protection, the Madrid
Protocol should be the basis for the international registry because
it provides a workable framework for protection in its existing
form. The Madrid Protocol, like the Paris Convention, could be
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. In addition, GATT 1994
already has enforcement procedures in effect as part of its dispute
settlement mechanisms. Thus, incorporating the Madrid Protocol
into the TRIPS Agreement would ensure effective enforcement.
Finally, GAIT 1994 already has a large membership, with 117
signatories. 210 Incorporation would ensure that such a registry
would truly be international.
207. Id. art. 9q iqW, .
208. Freeman, supra note 79, at 84.
209. Leaffer, supra note 24, at 300-01.
210. Freeman, supra note 79, at 90.
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Many important questions remain: Who will administer the
international registration system? Who will enforce it and deal
with violations? And why is an international register as part of the
TRIPS Agreement a better solution than international agreements?
1. Administration
Two bodies could administer an international registration
system: the International Bureau of WIPO and the Council for
TRIPS (Council) under the auspices of the WTO. The Council
would be the ideal administrator for the new system, working in
conjunction with the International Bureau of WIPO. This is
especially true if the Madrid Protocol is incorporated into the
TRIPS Agreement in its existing form because the International
Bureau of WIPO will be the administrating body of the Madrid
Protocol. In fact, the TRIPS Agreement already provides for the
Council to consult with WIPO.
2  es
If provisions for an international register are appended to the
TRIPS Agreement, the Council is the most sensible choice for
administration of the international register as part of its duties
under the TRIPS Agreement. This arrangement eliminates the
need for an additional governing body because the Council is
already in place. The Council, however, should consult with the
International Bureau of WIPO because WIPO already has
expertise in the trademark registration.
2. Enforcement
If the WTO includes an international registry as part of the
TRIPS Agreement, enforcement becomes a non-issue. The
Understanding on Rules and Proceduies Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (Understanding),"' which is part of GAIT 1994,
would deal with any enforcement problems. In previous rounds,
countries could select to be bound by certain agreements. The
WTO Agreement, however, specifically provides that all GAIT
1994 multilateral trade agreements are binding on all members."'
211. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 68.
212. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A2 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Understanding], reprinted in THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 10, at 404-33; 33 LL.M. 1125, 1226-48
(1994).
213. WTO Agreement, supra note 94, art. 2(2). See also Samuel C. Straight, Note,
GA TT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty
[Vol. 18:671
Trademark Piracy in Latin America
Thus, members must submit disputes to the decision-making body
under the Understanding, and all member countries must abide by
the determinations.
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) oversees the application
of the Understanding.2 14 Representatives from all WTO member
countries comprise the DSB.215 The duties of the DSB are: (1)
to establish panels to hear disputes; (2) to adopt panel and
Appellate body reports; (3) to oversee the implementation of panel
recommendations the DSB adopts; and (4) to authorize retaliation,
such as suspension of trade concession.
216
The dispute resolution methods provided by GAIT 1994 are
far superior to .those of multilateral agreements like the Paris
Convention or the Madrid Protocol. 1 If a dispute arises under
an agreement governed by the International Bureau of WIPO, the
plaintiff must bring the dispute before the International Court of
Justice, which has been an ineffective forum for dispute resolu-
tion.218 Enforcement has been ineffective under multilateral
agreements because of the political composition of WIPO, which
sympathizes with countries that do not want to provide increased
intellectual property protection.219 Thus, an international registry
for trademarks as part of GAIT 1994 provides a better solution
than an international registry as part of a multilateral agreement
because of GAT 1994's superior dispute resolution mechanism.
The effectiveness of the new dispute resolution panel is still
unknown.2 0 Some speculate that bureaucracy will overshadow
its effectiveness' Because of the significant changes, only time
will tell how well the new dispute resolution mechanisms will work.
An additional method to resolve piracy problems in the
United States is "Special" 301. GATT 1994 allows the United
States, 45 DuKE LJ. 216,219-20 (1995).
214. See Understanding, supra note 212, art. 2.
215. James H. Carter, Dispute Resolution and International Agreements, in INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 1995, at 435, 519 (PLI Corn. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 726, 1995).
216. Understanding, supra note 212, art. 2(1).
217. Leaffer, supra note 24, at 300-01.
218. Id. at 294, 301.
219. Id. at 294.
220. Katherine C. Spelman, Combating Counterfeiting, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT 1995: MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION 309, 333 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 417, 1995).
221. Id. at 333.
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States to continue pursuing "Special" 301 actions separate from the
DSB of the WTO.22 The effectiveness of "Special" 301 actions
in the future is speculative because of international politics among
competing and allied countries.' Presently, however, "Special"
301 actions remain a viable alternative in disputes over trademark
piracy.
3. The Better Solution: An International Registry Under the
TRIPS Agreement
An international registration system for trademarks under the
TRIPS Agreement is a better solution than one under a multilater-
al agreement for several reasons. One reason is.that the TRIPS
Agreement requires countries to make substantive changes to their
intellectual property laws in order to comply with the provisions of
the TRIPS Agreement. The first twelve articles and Article 19 of
the Paris Convention were also incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement, requiring member countries to provide certain
substantive rights to their citizens and citizens of member coun-
tries.' Thus, the TRIPS Agreement provides a basis for harmo-
nizing laws among countries. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement
provides for national treatment and most favored nation treatment
so that foreigners can benefit from newly instituted laws in member
countries.
Another reason that an international register under the TRIPS
Agreement is superior is because GATT 1994's dispute resolution
system is better than the system provided under the International
Bureau of WIPO with multilateral agreements. The DSB, unlike
the International Bureau of WIPO, provides an effective forum to
resolve disputes. A final reason is that GATT 1994 has many more
members than the Madrid Agreement, the TRT, and the Madrid
Protocol combined, making an international registry under GATT
1994 a true solution to the worldwide problem of trademark piracy.
V. CONCLUSION
Members of the international community should enact an
international registration system to curb trademark piracy. An
international registry as part of the TRIPS Agreement provides the
222. Id. at 332.
223. Id.
224. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2(1).
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best solution. An international registry will prevent future piracy
of trademarks because companies will have to file their trademarks
only once. The TRIPS Agreement will protect against piracy
because countries will have to make substantive changes to their
intellectual property laws. This solution need not be retroactive
because that would be unreasonable and impractical. Thus, this
solution does not aid a company such as Reebok, whose trademark
has already been appropriated by pirates. It, however, will assist
international companies like Reebok in the future. Moreover,
Reebok will benefit when and if it regains the right to its
trademark in Peru.
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